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Abstract
Defendant Ross was convicted of armed robbery, assault and battery by means of a dangerous
weapon, and assault and battery with intent to commit murder.
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Voir Dire Examination: Minority Defendants Are Not
Always Entitled to Have Specific Questions Asked of

Potential Jurors Regarding Possible Racial Prejudice:
Ristaino v. Ross

Defendant Ross was convicted of armed robbery, assault and battery
by means of a dangerous weapon, and assault and battery with intent
to commit murder. Ross was black; the victim, a security guard at
Boston University, was white.
At trial, Ross's counsel asked the judge to question the prospective
jurors about any possible racial prejudices they might have against the
defendant. The trial judge refused to ask specific questions but asked
the prospective jurors general questions concerning bias or prejudice.1
On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 2 Ross's
convictions were upheld. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari,3 vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration. The Court based its decision upon the results reached in
Ham v. South Carolina. In Ham, the Court held that the defendant was
constitutionally entitled to have questions asked of prospective jurors
about potential racial bias. 5 The Supreme Court of Massachusetts reconsidered Ross and again affirmed,6 holding that Ham did not affect
the result reached in its earlier deliberation because Ham involved "special circumstances";7 Ham had claimed he was arrested as a result of
1. Commonwealth v. Ross, 361 Mass. 665, 282 N.E.2d 70 (1973).
2. Id.
3.

Ross v. Massachusetts, 410 U.S. 901 (1973).

4. 409 U.S. 524 (1973). In Ham, defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana and sentenced to 18 months confinement. Certiorari was granted by the United
States Supreme Court to determine if the trial judge's refusal to examine jurors on voir
dire about possible prejudice violates defendant's federal constitutional rights. Ham was
a young bearded Black who was well known locally for his work in civil rights activities.
His basic defense at the trial was that law enforcement officers were "out to get him"
because of his civil rights activities, and that he had been framed on the drug charge.
5.
6.
7.
arrested
(1976).

Id.
Commonwealth v. Ross, 363 Mass. 665, 296 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1973).
"Special circumstances" have been interpreted to exist when a defendant is
allegedly because of his race or minority status. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589
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his civil rights activities. In contrast, the defendant in Ross did not
present any special circumstances resulting in his arrest, but was an
ordinary black person accused of a crime against a white person.
Ross's second petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court was denied.' Following this denial, Ross filed a petition in the
United States District Court of Massachusetts seeking a writ of habeas
corpus.' In granting the writ, the district court held that the petitioner
had a constitutional right to have the issue of racial prejudice specifically called to the attention of prospective jurors on voir dire examination. 10
The State appealed this decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, which affirmed the granting of the writ."
However, the United States Supreme Court reversed 2 the lower court
and HELD that the need to question jurors specifically about racial
prejudice did not rise to constitutional dimensions without the presence
of "special circumstances."'"
The first case to deal with the issue of questioning racial bias at
voir dire examination was Aldridge v. United States," in which a black
man was tried and convicted for the murder of a white police officer.
During the voir dire examination, the judge did not ask the prospective
jurors any questions specifically relating to racial prejudice, although
such questions were requested by defense counsel. Based on this infirmity, the United States Supreme Court reversed' 5 holding that it is better
to question prospective jurors about racial prejudice than to allow the
possibility that a juror might sit on a case with a disqualifying state of
mind.'
8. Ross v. Massachusetts, 414 U.S. 1080 (1973) (three justices dissenting).
9. Ross v. Ristaino, 388 F. Supp. 99 (D. Mass. 1974). In a recently decided case,
Stone v. Powell, 96 S.Ct. 3037 (1976), the Supreme Court put an end to this type of
habeas corpus action, noting: "[W]here the state has provided an opportunity for full
and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted
federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional
search or seizure was introduced at the trial." The Court noted that it would "deny
federal habeas jurisdiction (as sought by Ross) over claims of Fourth Amendment
brought by state prisoners." Id. at 3052.
10. Ross v. Ristaino, 388 F.Supp. 99 (D. Mass. 1974).
1. Ross v. Ristaino, 508 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1974).
12. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
13. Id. at 597.
14. 283 U.S. 308 (1931).
15.
16.

Id.
Id. at 315. The Court noted: "If in fact, sharing the general sentiment, they
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Many courts have since relied on Aldridge in upholding a minority
defendant's right to question jurors on voir dire about potential racial
prejudice. These courts have held that refusal to ask the questions when
propounded by the defense constitutes reversible error.17 In one such
case, a black man was convicted of raping a white woman.'" In this case,
questions designed to reveal racial prejudice were not allowed to be
asked of prospective jurors. The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed, stating:
It appears from the remarks made by the [trial] court that its ruling was
based upon the ground that in a court of justice no distinction should be
made between Negro and white persons and that, therefore, the very
thought that it was possible for a juror to be so prejudiced against Negroes that he would be less apt to believe their testimony. . . should be
carefully kept from the minds of prospective jurors ...
We cannot be blind to the fact that there may still be some who are
biased against the Negro race and would be more easily convinced of a
Negro's guilt than of a white man's guilt ...
So long as race prejudice exists, even in a relatively few persons,
there is substantial chance that one of those few will appear in court as a
venireman."
Until 1973, when Ham was decided, Aldridge was steadily interpreted as setting a broad rule that a minority defendant has a right to
have prospective jurors questioned about racial prejudice. In United
States v. Robinson," the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit noted unequivocally: "[A]ny doubts as to the mandatory requirements of the Aldridge rule were dispelled by. . .Ham.... 21
[the jurors] were found to be impartial, no harm would be done in permitting the
question; but if any one of them was shown to entertain a prejudice which would
preclude his rendering a fair verdict, a gross injustice would be perpetrated in allowing
him to sit." Id. at 314.
17. See, e.g., King v. United States, 362 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States
v. Robinson, 466 F.2d 780 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Robinson, 485 F.2d 1157
(3d Cir. 1973); People v. Powers, 482 F.2d 941 (8th Cir. 1973); People v. Wray,49 Mich.
App. 344, 212 N.W.2d 78 (Ct. App. 1973); State v. Higgs, 143 Conn. 138, 120 A.2d
152 (1950).
18. State v. Higgs, 143 Conn. 138, 120 A.2d 152 (1956).
19. Id. at 154. The court also cited Aldridge as holding that the exclusion of
questions designed to reveal a prospective juror's prejudice against the Negro race was
reversible error.
20. 485 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1973).

21. Id.at 1159.
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A Michigan case, People v. Wray,12 also dealt with Ham and considered it solid support for a defendant's right to ask questions concerning possible racial bias of jurors. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals
noted:

The outcome of the instant appeal is squarely controlled by a recent
decision of the United States Supreme Court [Ham v. South
Carolina. .

.

. [11n reversing the defendant's conviction, the Supreme

Court [in Ham] unanimously held that the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment imposed a duty upon the
trial court to question jurors on the subject of racial prejudice. "
The only factual similarities between Ham and Wray were that
both defendants were black; both were denied requests to question prospective jurors about racial bias; and both defendants' counsel did not
object to the trial court's refusal. The defense in Wray did not establish
"special circumstances," as had been established in Ham.
Robinson and Wray interpreted Ham as indicating that a black
defendant is entitled to propound questions about racial prejudice to
prospective jurors without establishing "special circumstances." However, Ristaino v. Rossu greatly narrowed the interpretation of Ham by
confining its constitutional holding to situations where "racial issues
'
. . . were inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial." 2s
In Commonwealth v. Ross,2s the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
held that the factual circumstances of Ross, in contrast to the special
circumstances of Ham, did not give rise to constitutional scrutiny. In
Ristaino v. Ross,2 ' the Supreme Court determined Ham to be controlling. However, this produced an internal inconsistency, since Ham was
based on Aldridge, and Aldridge was a much broader ruling, giving
defendants an unconditional constitutional right to question potential
jurors about racial bias. Noting this, the Court concluded: "In light of
22. 49 Mich. App. 344, 212 N.W.2d 78 (Ct. App. 1973).
23. Id. at 345, 212 N.W.2d at 79.
24. 424 U.S. 589. The Court noted that Ham did not require universal applicability, but required assessment as to the "likelihood that absent questioning about racial
prejudice, the jurors would not be as 'indifferent as [they stand] unsworne. . . .'" Id.
at 596. The Court found that the circumstances of questions of Ham's being a civil rights
activist were sufficient to include specific questions regarding racial prejudice. Id. at 598.
25. Id. at 597.
26. Commonwealth v. Ross, 363 Mass. 665, 296 N.E.2d 810 (1973).

27. 424 U.S. 589.
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our holding today, the actual result in Aldridge should be recognized
as an exercise of our supervisory power over the federal courts.""
The similar facts of Aldridge, Ham, and Ristaino cannot be reconciled with their inconsistent holdings. In Ham, the defendant was a
black civil rights worker, who claimed that his civil rights work was the
cause of his arrest for possession of marijuana. In Ristaino, the defendant was black, and the victim was a white security guard. The Supreme
Court's opinion in this case seemed to indicate that a black man arrested
for possession of marijuana is entitled to have jurors specifically questioned as to racial prejudice, but a black man arrested for crimes of
violence against a white security officer is not entitled to the same rights.
This distinction seems to hinge on the nature of the special circumstances of Ham-specifically, the sensitive issue of civil rights work. The
defendant in Ristaino faced a harsher sentence than the defendant in
Ham. However, he appears to have been given less constitutional protection, owing to the application of the "special circumstances" principle.
Another apparent inconsistency in the holdings .is that the circumstances of the crime in Aldridge and Ross are very similar. In
Aldridge,* a black man was convicted of the murder of a white policeman. In Ross,* the defendant, also a black man, was convicted of the
commission of violent crimes against a white security officer.
Attempting to reconcile the differences between Ross and Ham,31the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated, in Ross v. Ristaino:
In Ham, the defendant was a civil rights leader, while in this case the
black defendant is for the purpose of this inquiry an ordinary black
citizen. But in this case, the charges against the defendant involved violence against a white, not a victimless crime like possession of marijuana.
Moreover the white victim, a security officer at Boston University, had
a status close to that of a police officer. In addition, the eyewitness
testimony of a white'gas station attendant, was a major part of the state's
case against Ross. . . . On these facts the District Court was not in error
28. Id. at 598, n. 10. Aldridge originated in a federal court because the defendant
was a federal prisoner, whereas Ristaino, which involved a state prisoner, originated in
a state court. Therefore, to clarify an apparently inconsistent decision, the Court in
Ristaino interpreted its Aldridge holding as an exercise of its supervisory power over
the federal courts rather than as a broad constitutional requirement.

29. 283 U.S. 308 (1931).
30. 362 Mass. 665, 282 N.E.2d 70 (1973).
31. 508 F.2d 754 (Ist Cir. 1974).
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in concluding that the likelihood of infection of the verdict [by racial
prejudice] was at least as great as it was in Ham. In effect, the [District]
Court held that a black defendant charged with violent crimes against a
white security officer would be likely to be a special target of racial
prejudice."3'

The Supreme Court in Ristaino v. Ross3 rejected the court of
appeals treatment of the case by highlighting the factual distinction
between Ristaino and Ham, and by finding a crucial absence of special
circumstances. The Court felt that the lower court read Ham "too
broadly" by finding the facts to require special questioning about racial
prejudice.34
Before Commonwealth v. Ross- was decided, Ham was not interpreted narrowly. As previously mentioned, 3 United States v.
Robinson and People v. Wray discussed, interpreted, and applied
Ham. However, neither indicated that Ham was a limiting ruling, especially since these cases, which followed Ham, involved ordinary circumstances and not the special circumstances which are now required. The
narrow, limiting effect of Commonwealth v. Ross"9 has been applied
in recent casesA4 The Supreme Court of Massachusetts has consistently
followed its holding in Ross by not allowing "ordinary" black defendants to question prospective jurors about potential racial bias.,
Regretfully, it appears that Ristaino v. Ross' 2 will have a severe
impact on the effectiveness of the voir dire examination by inhibiting
the defense counsel's ability to determine if any jurors are prejudiced
against his or her client. Amendment VI of the United States Constitution states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a . . . trial, by an impartialjury of the State and district
32. Id. at 756.
33. 424 U.S. 589.
34. Id. at 594.

35. 363 Mass. 665, 296 N.E.2d 810 (1973).
36. See text accompanying notes 20 and 22, supra.
37. 485 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1973).
38. 49 Mich. App. 334, 212 N.W.2d 78 (Ct. App. 1973).
39. 363 Mass. 665, 296 N.E.2d 810 (1973).

40. United States v. Diggs, 522 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v.
Perez-Martinez, 525 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1976).
41.

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ryles, 363 Mass. 674, 296 N.E.2d 816 (1973);

Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 364 Mass. 87, 300 N.E.2d 192 (1973); Commonwealth
v. Bumpus, 309 N.E.2d 491 (1974).
42. 424 U.S. 589.
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... .""

The holding in

Ristaino v. Ross" will make the constitutional right to an impartial jury
a truly uncertain and theoretical one. By so limiting the scope of the voir
dire examination, it is highly possible that a strongly biased individual
could sit as juror in a criminal case with no chance of being discovered.
It is not likely that any harm would result from questioning prospective
jurors about possible racial bias. However, there is no doubt that great
harm could occur from not asking these questions. Voir dire examination is a vital part of the jury selection process, and it-should be exercised to its fullest potential.
In Aldridge, the Supreme Court looked to the value of an effective
voir dire examination and said:
If in fact, sharing the general sentiment, [the jurors] were found to be
impartial, no harm would be done in permitting the question [as to racial
bias]; but if any one of them was shown to entertain a prejudice which
would preclude his rendering a fair verdict, a gross injustice would be
perpetrated in allowing him to sit."
The Ristaino Court made a seemingly inconsistent comment in a
footnote stating:
Although we hold that voir dire questioning directed to racial prejudice
was not constitutionally required the wiser course generally is to pro-pound appropriate questions designed to identify iacial prejudice if requested by the defendant. Under our supervisory power we would have
required as much of a federal court faced with the circumstances here.
The states also are free to allow or require questions not demanded by
the constitution. ....
4

Thus, even though the Supreme Court believed it might have been
wiser to have asked the requested questions, the Court refused to find
that this right had constitutional dimensions. The Court's reasoning is
43.

U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.

44. 424 U.S. 589.
45. 283 U.S. 308, at 314 (1931). The Court went on to say:
We think it would be far more injurious to permit it to be thought that persons
entertaining a disqualifying prejudice were allowed to serve as jurors and that
inquiries designed to elicit the fact of disqualification were barred. No surer way
could be devised to bring the processes of justice into disrepute.
Id. at 315.
46. 424 U.S. 589, 597 n. 9 (citations omitted).
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not clear. This lack of clarity is magnified by the Court's statement that

"under our supervisory power we would have required as much of a
federal court faced with the circumstances here." 7 In effect, this means
a defendant in a federal court might, under the Supreme Court's supervisory power, be entitled to have questions about racial bias asked of a
potential venireman, but a defendant in a state court would have no such
right, and would have to rely solely on the discretion of the particular
judge.

By basing their analysis on the existence or absence of "special
circumstances," the Court has missed a crucial point in determining
whether a defendant is entitled to question potential veniremen about
racial bias. The Court makes it appear that the only time one is subjected to racial prejudice is when his or her race has been a cause of the
arrest. 8
Three Supreme Court Justices disagreed with the majority's treat9
ment of Ross v. Massachusetts."
Justice Marshall's dissent, in which
Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan joined, pointed out that the
Aldridge Court was not concerned with the popularity of the defendant
"but rather with the potential racial bias of the particular jurors who
are to try the accused."' 0The dissent further pointed out: "The principle
that fairness demands such [voir dire] inquiry is, if anything, far more
pervasive today than it was when Aldridge was decided, in both federal
and state courts." 5' A defendant runs the risk of facing "biased jurors
regardless of the specific crime for which he is being tried. A juror does
not have to hear facts of a case intertwined with racial overtones to have
biased views toward certain minorities.
The dissenting justices ended their opinion by stating:
To deny this petition for certiorari is to see our decision in Ham v. South
Carolina stillborn at birth and to write an epitaph for those "essential
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 363 Mass. 665, 296 N.E.2d 810 (1973) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1080 (1973)
(Marshall, J., Brennan, J., Douglas, J., dissenting).
50. 414 U.S. 1080, 1083 (1973).
51. Id. at 1084. The dissent noted:

[Tio say that petitioner [Ross] is not a potential target of racial prejudice would
be to ignore as judges what we must all know as men ... where, as here and in
the strikingly similar circumstances of the Aldridge case, a Negro is being accused
of an attack on a white policeman, it would be disingenuous at best to assert that
he is not apt to be a particular target of racial prejudice.
Id. at 1085.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol1/iss1/11

8

et al.: Voir Dire Examination: Minority Defendants Are Not Always Entitle
-1 1:1977

Ristaino v. Ross

143 1

demands of fairness" recognized by this Court forty years ago in
Aldridge. I fear that we "bring the processes of justice into disrepute"
not only by sanctioning the denial of a right required by "essential de-

mands of fairness" but also in failing to compel compliance by the court
below with a precedent of this Court [Ham] barely a year since decided.S
It appears that, as a result of the decision in Ristaino v. Ross,"
the future of the impartiality of state juries will depend solely upon the
trial judge's discretion. As Ristaino illustrates, the Supreme Court has
chosen to narrow its review of state cases involving a defendant's right
to have specific questions asked of prospective jurors. Viewing the instant case along with Stone v. Powel," it appears that the Supreme
Court has initiated a trend toward narrowly limiting its review of claims
made by state defendants of violations of their constitutional rights. One
cannot help wondering why the Supreme Court is abdicating its role as
the protector of a state prisoner's constitutional rights.
Jacquelyn Plasner
52. Id. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented from the decision in the instant
case for the same reasons stated in Ross v. Massachusetts, 414 U.S. 1080 (1973).
(dissenting opinion).
53. 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
54. 96 S.Ct. 3137 (1976).
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